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The Law and the Whale:






T HE LAW HAS had a long involvement in the fortunes of the
whale. Unfortunately for the whale, the law and the institu-
tions for its enforcement have been as frequently hostile to the
whale as they have been friendly.
However, the law is an instrument of policy. Thus, in reality
it has been the past policy of human beings to formulate laws and
to create institutions which have made of the whale an endangered
species. Basic changes in such policies can reverse this process
and properly protect them. Indeed, there were several efforts to
achieve such a reversal during the early decades of the twentieth
century when whale "harvesting," as it has been called, was reach-
ing its highest levels. These early efforts at conservation all failed,
but are important because they incorporated legal principles or
enunciated positions which foreshadowed those of contemporary
environmentalists.
Early Effort at Conservation
In the days before the scientific and technological explosion,
which reached its take-off stage only with the era of World War
II, the whale served a variety of economic needs. Thus, there
were few efforts to preserve and protect it from its catchers; how-
ever, there were several that are noteworthy. For example, in
1924, the League of Nations established a Committee of Interna-
tional Law. Its reporter was M. Jose Leon Suarez of Argentina.
In his 1925 report, he observed that the whaling industry was
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"rapidly exterminating the whale." '  He also stated that "the
riches of the sea, and especially the immense wealth of the Ant-
arctic region, are the patrimony of the whole human race, and
our Committee is the body best qualified to suggest to the Govern-
ments what steps should be taken before it is too late."2
The first League effort proved inauspicious for the whale.
Although the United States suggested in 1927 that "an interna-
tional conference is desirable to consider the problem of conserv-
ing the whale," 3 this was opposed by several nations, one of whom,
Japan, urged that the matter be handled through bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements among directly concerned countries.
The matter seemed to be dead by 1929. The position was
summed up as follows:
There seems at present little danger of complete extermination
of the species in view of the nature of modern whaling, the
amount of capital involved being so considerable that a com-
pany must kill a considerable number of whales in order to be
able to make profits, and if hunting becomes unprofitable,
it will stop by itself, long before the whales are exterminated. 4
Nonetheless, a number of concerned nations under League
auspices negotiated a Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
on September 24, 1931.5 Thus was begun a faltering system of
international legal regulation, which down to the immediate past
seems to have been designed more for the short-range economic
benefit of whale catchers than for the welfare of the general
community - certainly not for the benefit of the whale. The
1931 agreement imposed only limited restrictions on the signatories.
It prohibited destructive and wasteful methods of whaling such
as the taking of very young whales and females with offspring.
Two of the major whaling nations, Japan and Russia, did not ac-
cept it. The agreement was essentially unenforceable. However,
the United States endeavored to meet the obligations which it
I M. Suarez, Report on the Exploitation of the Products of the Sea, 20 AM. J.
INT'L L. 231, 235 (Supp. July 1926).
2 Id. at 236.
3 L.N. Doc. C.196.M.70.1927.V. at 161, cited in L. Leonard, Recent Negotia-
tions Toward the International Regulation of Whaling, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, 98, n.38
(1941).
1 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 1594 (1929); Leonard, supra note 3, at 99.
5 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079,
T.S. No. 880. Reasons for such an agreement are set out in Jessup, The Inter-
national Protection of Whales, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1930).
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had assumed by enacting the Whaling Treaty Act of March 31,
1932.6
Britain hosted a conference on whaling in 1937. This resulted
in the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling
and the Final Act of June 8, 1937. 7 Interested nations met again
in London in 1938 and entered into a Protocol Amending the
International Agreement and Final Act of June 24, 1938.8 These
agreements produced a whaling season, prescribed minimum
lengths for certain species, provided that each factory ship was to
carry one government inspector, and closed whaling in certain
areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans for identified
species. This was followed by an informal conference in London
on July 17, 1939. Although it bore the title "International Con-
ference for the Regulation of Whaling," the effort centered on
securing compliance with earlier agreements and attempted to in-
duce Japan to adhere to the 1937 Agreement and the 1938 Pro-
tocol. 9
The Second World War prevented further legal efforts on be-
half of the whale until 1944. However, by 1944 the British con-
vened interested nations for discussions and out of this resulted
the 1944 Protocol. This Protocol introduced the "principle of a
maximum total catch for the season in Antarctic pelagic whaling;
not more than 16,000 blue whale units were to be taken in the
open season in the area south of 400 South Latitude." 1°  The
blue whale unit was equated with two fin whales, two and one-
half humpback whales, and six sei whales. In retrospect, this deci-
sion has been seen as unwise. In 1973 it was described in these
terms:
Unfortunately, because this unit of measurement was scien-
tifically unsound, it legitimized indiscriminate reduction of all
species.11
With the close of World War II, intensive whaling operations
were reinstituted. Catches that had peaked in 1940, and which had
6 Whaling Treaty Act of March 31, 1932, 49 Stat. 1246.
7 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling and the Final Act
of June 8, 1937, 52 Stat. 1467, T.S. No. 933.
8 Protocol Amending the International Agreement and Final Act of June 24,
1938, 53 Stat. 1794, T.S. No. 944.
9 Leonard, supra note 3, at 105.
10 D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 400 (1965); 148 U.N.T.S.
11, 43.
11 THE FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
345 (1973).
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fallen off considerably during 1942 through 1945, began to be very
large again in 1945 and in 1946.12 Concern over excessive kills,
including the very great possibility that certain kinds of whales,
especially the blue, were marked for extinction, led the United
States to call a conference to deal with the situation. The confer-
ence met in Washington, D.C., and in December, 1946, produced
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.13
The United States ratified the Convention on July 18, 1947.
The nations bound by the Convention have changed during the
years. Peru was a party at one time, but is no longer. Japan
was not bound for many years, but now is. At the present time,
the following are parties to the Convention: Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Nor-
way, Panama, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States. The same nations are also parties
to the Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling of November 19, 1956.14 The Protocol became effec-
tive for the United States on May 4, 1959.
The 1946 Convention sets forth today's international law of
whaling. The Convention calls for annual meetings of the In-
ternational Whaling Commission, and pursuant to the terms of the
agreement conditions in which the member States can engage in
whaling are fixed by annual Schedules. The 1946 Convention and
the 1946 Schedule fixed a variety of methods to allow for an ex-
pected optimum condition. This optimum condition, as foreseen
in 1946, would allow for both the killing of whales and also the
protection of the whale stocks. This hope has never been realized;
although, there have been some corrective actions over time as
the stock has been depleted, or largely so, depending on the type
of whale.
In broad terms, the 1946 agreements prohibited the killing of
some types (gray and right whales); prohibited killing under cer-
tain circumstances because of age, sex, and size; prohibited the
use of factory ships to kill baleen whales in certain areas; fixed
hunting seasons and hunting areas for certain species; imposed
limits on the total catch of certain species; required notifications
of catches made in certain areas; prohibited the use of land sta-
12 J. McHugh, The Role and History of the International Whaling Commission,
THE WHALE PROBLEM, A STATUS REPORT 303, 306-307 (W. Schevill ed. 1974).
13 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, July 18, 1947,
62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 1 U.N.T.S. 2124.
14 Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Nov. 19, 1956, 10 U.S.T. 952, T.I.A.S. No. 4228, 338 U.N.T.S. 366.
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tions and vessels harboring there from hunting during a portion
of each year; restricted the mobility of factory ships; required that
all parts of whales hunted commercially be used for commercial
purposes; fixed compensation standards for gunners and crews;
imposed the requirement that hunters report to the International
Whaling Commission detailed information on kills, position of calv-
ing grounds and the migration routes of whales; and, required
each member nation to provide the Commission with copies of na-
tional laws whereby each nation imposed on its whalers the duty
to conform to the terms of the Convention. The Schedule also
readopted the concept of the blue whale unit, and provided "[t]he
number of baleen whales taken during the open season caught in
any waters south of 400 South Latitude by whale catchers at-
tached to factory ships under the jurisdiction of the Contracting
Governments shall not exceed sixteen thousand blue whale
units. "15
The organic terms of the Convention contained a major defect.
The Commission, as a governing body but without any enforce-
ment authority of its own, was expected to amend the Schedule
annually in order to modify seasons, areas of whaling, and most
importantly, quotas. Thus, while the member nations could regu-
late the conservation and utilization of whale resources by a three-
fourths vote of all members, an escape from any such decision
was also provided. Pursuant to Article V of the Convention, any
member nation was entitled to present an objection to such a
three-fourths" decision. Having made such an objection, and not
having subsequently withdrawn it, the objecting nation would not
be bound by the majority vote. This allowed for a system in which
certain nations, in particular Japan and the Soviet Union, oper-
ated beyond the wishes of the majority and were immune from
the limitations and prohibitibns mentioned above. Thus, despite
the terms of the Convention, the 1946 Schedule and the subse-
quent Schedules, the killing of blue whales increased up to 1951,
humpbacks with varied annual catches up to 1959, fins to 1952,
sei through 1965, and sperm through 1970. By 1968 the blue and
the humpback had been essentially eliminated as economic re-
sources and were threated as species. Nonetheless, following 1966,
the fin, sei, and sperm whales were being caught in large num-
bers, with the sei and the sperm whales subjected to very substan-
tial increases in catches as compared with 1946.16
is International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, July 18, 1947,
Schedule, para. 8(a), supra note 13.
16 McHugh, supra note 12, at 306-307.
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The Controversy Over the International Whaling Commission
The differences in values and policy positions between national
and international environmental and conservation organizations
and the whaling industries of the major whaling nations have be-
come transposed into the official or semi-official positions of many
of the nations represented on the International Whaling Commis-
sion. Indeed, it has often been the case that the delegation of a
nation is composed of representatives of the IWA whaling industry
of that nation. For example, Iwao Fujita, President of the Japa-
nese Whaling Association is also delegate from Japan on the
International Whaling Commission. Or conversely, another na-
tional delegation may be representative of a conservationist posi-
tion. This situation, which has become characteristic of the
contemporary era, is not only a fundamental source of divisions on
the Commission, but renders more difficult the fulfillment of the
conflict reduction mission of this international organization. In
the perspective of Black and Falk, "[c]onflict management is
the central problem of the international legal order, the fundamen-
tal yardstick by which the adequacy of the system as a whole must
be measured."i7 Therefore, the issues to be resolved within the
jurisdiction of the International Whaling Commission provide a
significant series of tests of the conflict resolution capabilities of
that international organization. The organizational structure and
jurisdictional capabilities, or deficiencies, of the IWC are of ob-
vious importance in such an assessment. The very terms of its
organization contain the seeds for internal and external conflict
because they are essentially contradictory. The terms propose "to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks, and thus make
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry." The
Commission has thus been charged with being merely a forum for
the whaling industry while virtually ignoring whale conservation
during most of its first two decades.
It was not until 1963 that the first quota reductions were
adopted. Later, total bans on the killing of certain species of whales
such as the blue, humpback, right and gray were adopted. The
reduction of the blue whale to 8,000, only 10 percent of its popula-
tion 30 years ago, has been dramatized by conservation groups
as a measure of the seriousness of the threat of whale extinction
and, during past years, of the ineffectiveness of the IWC. Studies
such as George Small's The Blue Whale have provided rather de-




tailed commentary on the consequences of the Commission's deci-
sions.18  Indeed, J. L. McHugh, former chairman of the IWC,
summed up the first two decades of the Commission in much the
same terms as some of the external critics:
From the time of the first meeting of the commission estab-
lished under the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling (1946) in 1949 to the disastrous meetiig of 1-964,
almost all major actions or failures to act were governed by
short-range economic considerations rather than by the require-
ments of conservation. 19
The impact of these policies was ultimately devastating for a wide
variety of whale stocks. As detailed above, as soon as one species
in a particular geographic area was depleted, the whaling indus-
try shifted to the next species and to geographic areas which it
deemed economically desirable. The development of modern tech-
nological methods for killing whales, particularly in the 20th cen-
tury, had dramatically changed the relationship of whalers to their
prey. In fact, whales had a respite from killing only in those ma-
jor periods when men devoted their energies to killing each other
in World Wars I and II. By the contemporary era, Japan and the
Soviet Union outstripped several other whaling nations such as
Norway and the Netherlands, which earlier in this century had
been leading whale harvesters. The United States whaling in-
dustry in both the 19th and 20th centuries had contributed to the
decimation of whale stocks. Scott McVay cited a modern example
of a California whaling company which virtually eliminated in one
decade a stock of humpbacks which had appeared regularly be-
tween Monterey and San Francisco. From the beginning of its
operations in 1956 and 1965 when the IWC prohibited the killing







McVay indicated that this virtual annhilation represents in micro-
18 G. SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE (1971).
19 McHugh, supra note 12, at 305-308.
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cosm, the familiar pattern of whaling which has taken place in the
major harvesting regions. 20
World opinion has long favored some international control
over whaling. Thus, in 1958 the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea adopted a resolution requesting "states to pre-
scribe, by all means available to them, those methods for the cap-
ture and killing of marine life, especially of whales and seals,
which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible."21
The growing concern of scientists and environmental groups for the
fate of whales became significant at the international level in the
1970s. In June of 1972, 110 nations, including the United States,
adopted a resolution urging a 10-year moratorium on the killing
of whales. This action, taken at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment at Stockholm, Sweden, was con-
firmed in June, 1973, at the first session of the United Nations
Governing Council for Environmental Programs held in Geneva,
Switzerland and reconfirmed at the second session of the same
international body meeting in March, 1974, in Nairobi, Kenya.
The key recommendation of the 1972 international resolution was
that "Governments agree to strengthen the international whaling
commission, to increase international research efforts, and as a
matter of urgency to call for an international agreement, under the
auspices of the international whaling commission and involving all
Governments concerned, for a 10-year moratorium on commercial
whaling. "22
The response by the major whaling nations at the next meet-
ing of the IWC, in 1972, was to reject the UNCHE resolution.
Following appeals by the United States in 1972 and in 1973 to the
IWC to adopt a moratorium and to fix quotas, and the rejection
of this position by both Japan and the Soviet Union, the United
States "lodged strong protests with both nations. "23 Within the
United States, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972, prohibiting catching or importation by the United
States citizens of marine mammals and their products, and the
Endangered Species Act of 1973.21 Worldwide protests over the
10 S. McVay, Reflections on the Management of Whaling, THE WHALE PROBLEM,
A STATUS REPORT 376 (W. Schevill ed. 1974).
21 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.56 (1958).
22 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, Recommendation 33 (1972).
23 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 443 (1974).
24 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027; Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884.
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refusal of Japan and the Soviet Union to accept scientifically de-
termined limitations heightened interest and attention in the 1974
IWC conference. Interestingly enough, the 10-year moratorium
did not come to a vote in the 1974 meeting. Instead, an alterna-
tive proposal was presented for implementation in the 1975-1976
whaling season by the Australian delegation. This alternative, the
provisions of which are reproduced below, has become the focal
point of controversy over both the future of whales and of the In-
ternational Whaling Commission itself. The proposal was pre-
sented as an amendment to the resolution for a 10-year morator-
ium sponsored in 1972, 1973, and 1974, by the United States dele-
gation.
AMENDMENT TO USA RESOLUTION
PROPOSED BY AUSTRALIA
Preamble
The International Whaling Commission
Noting that whale stocks are a common concern to mankind;
Concerned that some species of great whales are at present
considerably depleted below their optimum popula-
tion levels;
Recalling that the historic decline in whale populations oc-
curred not only because of excessive exploitation,
but also because knowledge was inadequate to protect
the species;
Motivated by the need to preserve and enhance whale stocks
as a resource now and for future use when food needs
of the world will be greater because of increased hu-
man population and by the need to maintain marine
ecosystems in a well-balanced condition capable of
high productivity;
Taking into consideration the long range interests of the con-
sumers of whale products and of the whaling industry
as cited in Article V.2 of the Convention;
And Recognizing that the management of whale stocks should
be based not only on the concepts of maximum sustain-
able yield in numbers by species, but should also in-
clude such considerations as total weight of whales
and interactions between species in the marine eco-
system;
Decides that
1. It shall classify all stocks of whales into one of three
categories according to the advice of the Scientific
Committee.
(a) Initial management stocks which may be reduced in a
controlled manner to achieve MSY levels or optimum
levels as these are determined.
1976]
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(b) Sustained management stocks which should be main-
tained at or near MSY levels and then at optimum
levels as these are determined.
(c) Protection stocks which are below the level of "Sus-
tained Management Stocks" as described in (b), which
should be fully protected.
The committee should define stocks for this purpose, as the
units which can be most effectively managed individually.
2. (a) Commercial whaling shall be permitted on "Initial
Management Stocks" subject to the advice of the
Scientific Committee as to measures necessary to
bring the stocks to the MSY level and then optimum
level in an efficient manner and without risk of re-
ducing them below this.
(b) Commercial whaling shall be permitted on "Sus-
tained Management Stocks" subject to the advice of
the Scientific Committee. There shall be no com-
mercial whaling of species or stocks classified as
"Protection Stocks," including those species listed
for full protection in the current schedule.
3. Also decides to implement this resolution by:
(a) Requesting the Scientific Committee to provide
advice on the criteria which should be used in de-
fining categories of whale stocks which should be
treated as in Section 1 above. This advice to be pro-
vided as soon as possible with a view to its incorpora-
tion in the Schedule.
(b) Directing the Scientific Committee to arrange to
provide the Commission with annually updated ad-
vice on these criteria and on the allocation of stocks
to the categories.
(c) Making all necessary amendments to the Schedule
not later than the 27th meeting of the Commission.
Background to the 1975 IWC Conference
On the eve of the 1975 conference of the International Whal-
ing Commission, opinions were sharply divided about the sci-
entific validity of the principle of "maximum sustainable yield"
(herein referred to as MSY), which is a key component of the
Australian amendment. Advocates cite the enhanced role of
scientists in that the IWC's scientific committee will determine
which whale stocks will be placed in which categories. Critics,
including some from the scientific community, have challenged
the MSY principle on the ground that its data is almost entirely
based upon sightings reported by whalers and that some of its
fundamental assumptions are not consistent with modern sci-
[Vol. 8:149
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entific methods and approaches. Dr. Lee Talbot of the U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality stated the opposing view in
these terms:
The present state of our knowledge of whales is still very primi-
tive. We have plenty of statistics from dead whales - but the
whole thrust of modern biology and ecology is away from total
reliance on such data and towards attempts to understand the
ecosystem and the organism's place in it.
I conclude that continued harvesting of the great whales on
the basis of the MSY calculations and the fragmentary and
very speculative data base we have is not scientifically justi-
fiable. 25
Just prior to the 1975 meeting of the International Whaling
Commission, No Man Apart, the publication of the Friends of the
Earth (hereafter referred to as FOE), an American environmental-
ist organization, attacked the proposed Australian amendment as
being "a watered-down version of the moratorium . . .nebulous
enough to offer the Japanese (in particular) the opportunity to
come up with some interpretation - such as why they can kill
more whales next season than ever before."6
Because the patterns of whaling practices have systematically
moved from the killing of the largest and most economically de-
sirable whales to progressively smaller varieties during the period
of IWC regulation, a number of environmental groups have
reached the same conclusions as Friends of the Earth: "It would
seem apparent that the IWC is incapable of reversing these
trends, otherwise it would have done so."27 The FOE bill of
particulars against the International Whaling Commission was
not limited to its serious criticism of the past performance of the
IWC. Its additional criticisms were detailed in order to provide a
stronger foundation for its proposals to abolish the IWC and place
the function of defending whales under the control of the United
Nations.
The FOE indictment of the IWC emphasized that:
whales often live in international waters and as such are the
common heritage of all nations regardless of whether or not they
have a coastline, the technology to kill whales, or the wish to
use whale products. The exploitation of whales by two major
nations for their short-term benefit is clearly unacceptable.
25 L. Talbot, New Quotas Set for Whales: 1974 I. W.C. Decisions, 5 MAIN-
STREAM 7 (Summer 1974).
2 J. Clark, A. King, & J. Burton, Save the Whales: Abolish the IWC!,
5 No MAN APART 1 (June 1975).
27 Id. at 2.
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Secondly, not all the countries which whale belong to the IWC;
the Japanese are developing more and more partly or wholly-
owned companies in countries such as Peru and Chile, which
do not belong to the IWC, and they carry on whaling from
these countries undeterred. Thirdly, the schedule to the IWC
permits any member to opt out of the commission's decisions by
lodging an objection within 90 days of the previous meeting.
This loophole is often used. 28
The FOE critique attacked head on the defenses of the IWC
which have been made by J. C. McHugh and others:
Many people have argued that, as the IWC is already in ex-
istence, it is better to reform it, rather than to create a new
organization. Indeed, the IWC has made various efforts to
improve itself, such as by abolishing the Blue Whale Unit and
expanding its staff and budget, but the IWC is trapped by its
very constitution, which commits it to protecting whaling in-
terests as well as whales. The IWC has been unable to serve
two masters, and has submitted to the interests of the whalers
in the fear that unless they did so, the whalers would walk out
of the Commission and continue whaling without any controls
or setting any quotas. 29
The alternative international agency and program proposed
by FOE was described explicitely in the same issue of its official
publication, No Man Apart:
Only an independent body with no vested interests in whaling or
whale products can make these sorts of decisions, and these
decisions should be made by all nations which are concerned
with the stability of the marine ecosystem, not just by the coun-
tries with the technology to kill whales. We believe that these
problems could be solved if the United Nations were to set up
an international cetacean convention, to be administered by one
of their agencies such as the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion or the UN Environment Programme. Such a convention
would implement a ten-year moratorium by protecting all the
great species of whales - the blue, right, bowhead, humpback,
gray, sperm, sei, brydes, minke, and fin - and by prohibiting the
deep-sea hunting of all cetaceans. To prevent non-signatory
nations from taking advantage of the cessation, all trade in the
products of the great whales would be prohibited. In order to
find out more about the scale of all shorebased small whale
fisheries, all ports and boats operating such fisheries would






The common heritage concept invoked by national and inter-
national environmental groups is identical to the position taken
by M. Jose Leon Suarez in his 1925 International Law report.
The dismissal of the notion that the International Whaling Com-
mission could be depended upon to protect whales insured con-
tinued controversy regardless of the stance taken by IWC in
the 1975 meeting. These strong recommendations, the punitive
boycotts suggested by several environmental groups, and the
continued pressure of world-wide opinion, plus the year-by-year
decline in the number of economically desirable whales apparently
helped create a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the two
major whaling nations, Japan and the Soviet Union.
The 1975 Meeting of the International Whaling Commission
The opening of the 27th annual meeting of the IWC began
with a dramatic announcement by the delegation from the Soviet
Union that it would phase out three Antarctic whaling fleets
"as a gesture to growing conservationist pressure." The Soviet
Union's delegate, Dr. I. V. Nikonorov, gave what was described
as cautious approval to a plan sponsored by Australia to reduce
the levels of catches and safeguard endangered species. The
Japanese delegate, Iwao Fujita, indicated that acceptance of the
Australian plan would not be easy for the Japanese whaling
industry, but that some agreement could be reached if limits
were not set in excess of conservation needs. In its plenary
session on Friday, June 27, 1975, the IWC adopted a far-reaching
program designed to protect whales from the threat of extinction
and to broaden the scope of research and conservation activities.
For the full text of the 1974 decisions of the IWC see the Appendix.
The major decision of the Commission was cited as "the most
important step yet taken in the protection of the whale from ex-
tinction" by Pearce Wright, Science Editor of The Times of
London. 31  This decision embodied a program of conservation
which not only reduced the catch for 1975 from 37,300 to 32,450
whales, but established for the first time levels of catch for all
oceans. Thus, North Atlantic whaling will be subject to a quota
system utilized in other ocean regions for some time. The deci-
sion was viewed by some delegates to the commission as a partial
fulfillment of their proposal for a 10-year moratorium on all whal-
ing, a position previously taken by the United States and sup-
31 The Times (London), June 28, 1975, at 2, col. 6.
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ported by Great Britain and other nonwhaling members of the
commission. Conversely, the new position represented a with-
drawal of the 10-year moratorium proposal.
Dr. Robert White, a commissioner from the United States,
indicated that the new procedures would establish a selective
moratorium which will prevent commercial whaling from bringing
any stock below a safety level. He suggested that:
This affords protection for whales long before they are reduced
to endangered levels. Previous practice placed whales in a pro-
tected status only when they approached extinction. As a
result of the decision by the International Whaling Commission,
commercial whaling will now be prohibited for all fin and sei
whales in the North Pacific; fin whales in almost all the An-
tarctic; fin whales in the North Atlantic except for areas around
Iceland and Newfoundland; sei whales in a major region of the
southern hemisphere, and sperm whales in the vicinity of eastern
Australia.32
The status of the largest of whales received particular atten-
tion in the meeting. Quotas for male and female sperm whales
were lowered by oceanic regions. In southern seas, the allowable
catch was reduced from 8,000 to 5,870 males and from 5,000 to
4,870 females. In the North Pacific, quotas were reduced from
6,000 to 5,200 males and from 4,000 to 3,100 females. In addition,
major structural changes designed to strengthen the Commis-
sion's secretariat were approved, as was a comprehensive review
of existing conventions to make the Commission "more consis-
tent with modern principles of conservation." The IWC also de-
cided to establish an international decade of cetacean research
in order to provide more scientific information on the behavior
and breeding patterns of whales.
One American delegate viewed the 1975 London meeting as
the most realistic in the Commission's history. He stated that:
It's finally dawned on the conservationists that the whaling
fleets can't be scrapped just like that, and on the whalers that
some species really are in danger of extinction. That's made it
easier for both sides to make accommodations and for the com-
mission to get down to its business of rational management of
whaling stocks. 33
For three years, 1972-1974, the United States had called for
a 10-year moratorium on whaling. Although it failed to muster
the three-fourths majority required for Commission approval, the
32 Quoted in The Times (London), id.
33 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
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position of the United States was. viewed as important to soften
opposition to drastically reduced catches.
As of late July, several factors still remained to be resolved.
First, each whaling nation which had membership in the Com-
mission retained its option to disapprove of the quota reductions
within 90 days of the decision. Actually, only eight member
nations engage in whaling. Although the London conference
showed greater inclination for compromise and possible agree-
ment than previous IWC conferences, the key actors are Japan
and the Soviet Union which harvest over 80 percent of the whale
catches. Secondly, there are six whaling nations which are not
members of the Commission: Chile, Peru, Portugal, Somalia,
Spain, and South Korea. While they currently only account for
6 percent of the current harvest, this ratio presumably could
change. Conservationist groups argue that whaling in some of
these nations is controlled by the big whaling nations.
Depending upon the resolution of these factors, the 1975 de-
cisions of the International Whaling Commission are quite sig-
nificant. Concurring with U.S. delegate Robert White, Norway's
delegate and the chairman of the IWC, Inge Rindal, viewed the
reduction as the sharpest on record, "effectively reducing next
season's total whale catch by 10,000 - from 37,000 to 27,000."
Rindal felt that Japan and the Soviet Union would not lodge
objections stating that "[b]oth the Soviets and Japanese went
along with most of the new quotas, while abstaining on others. '" 34
The policy of selective moratorium was applied to the finback,
second in size to the totally protected blue whale. Only 585 can
be caught in the 1975-76 season in the southern oceans and North
Atlantic. Last season's quota was 1,550. Drastic cuts were also
made for the sei, sperm, minke and brydes.
Some Immediate Reactions to the f975 Decisions
The most important question at the close of the 1975 IWC
meeting was whether the two largest whale harvesters would
conform to the cutbacks or exercise their options to refuse. Be-
cause the deadline for this work paper, August 1, 1975, occurred
before the end of the 90-day option period, the reactions sum-
marized are of necessity only the immediate ones. The final
actions and emergent policy decisions, if any, of the major whaling
nations, the nonwhaling nations of IWC, and the most active
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national and international environmental and conservation groups,
given expression either unilaterally or through appropriate inter-
national organizations, will take place in the coming months.
The immediate Japanese reactions to the new regulations of the
IWC were strong. The preliminary response implied both deep
disagreement with the proposed cutbacks and probable, albeit
reluctant, official compliance. Shigeru Hasui, a board member
of TAIYO Fishery Company, argued that the Australian proposal
would seriously cut back on whale meat production which was
cited as one of the major aims of Japan's whaling industry at
110,000 tons or "the equivalent to annual protein consumption
of more than 1,000,000 Japanese," or "about one percent of the
country's total protein consumption." 35 In November, 1974, in
anticipation of a serious controversy over harvesting quotas in
1975, Motokichi Morisawa, Executive Director of the Japan
Fisheries Association, had developed a fuller description of Ja-
pan's attitudes and needs with respect to whale meat:
In 1973, for example, domestic whale meat supplies in Ja-
pan totaled 123,000 tons, including 95,000 tons from mothership
whaling operations in the Antarctic Ocean and northern seas,
2,000 tons from coastal whaling and 26,000 tons from imports.
Of the total supplies, 61,500 tons were earmarked for general
public consumption, 15,000 tons for school lunches and related
branches and 46,000 tons for canned and processed food prod-
ucts, including ham and sausage. Whale meat thus offers an
important source of animal protein for the Japanese. Whale
meat in the same year also accounted for around 6 percent of
total supplies of meat products in this country.
If animal protein supplies, equivalent in volume to 123,000
tons of whale meat, are sought through imports, necessary im-
ports are estimated to reach around 220,000 tons in terms of
beef and over 290,000 tons in terms of pork. Beef imports then
will reach a level equal to 76 percent of domestic production
(290,000 tons in 1973) and 2.9-fold the actual imports in 1973 at
77,000 tons.
Japan's beef imports in that case will account for 12 percent
of the total volume of world beef trade. In view of the current
trend of the global meat situation as well as the latest trade
policy of the United States, such sizable imports of beef are
considered extremely difficult of realization.
Whale meat prices also are reasonably low despite the re-
cent advance of high-grade items. The price of whale meat at
present stands at a level about one-fourth that of beef and one-
half that of pork. It also is around 60 percent of that of chicken.
35 Y. Nakagawa, Japan's Whalers Brace for IWC 'Harpoon,' Japan Times
Weekly, June 28, 1975, at 11, col. 1.
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Whale meat thus is a valuable source of animal protein for
Japanese households. As such, a whaling ban is certain to bring
heavy pressure to bear on the household economy of the less
economically blessed stratum ...
Supporters of the campaign for an overall ban on whaling
and some countries, including Japan, in favor of continuing
whaling operations appear to be taking basically different
stands regarding the concept about the character of the whale
as an animal. It seems that the former holds the view that
whales should be classified in the same category of wild ani-
mals as lions, elephants and giraffes. In contrast, the latter
feels that whales are a source of esculent animals.
Food supplies cannot be increased sufficiently, swiftly and
sharply to keep pace with rising population. Food supplies
from lands are limited. Hence, animal protein resources re-
quired by man should be sought from seas for coping with the
situation. If management of marine resources is adequately
and scientifically carried out, oceans can be properly pastured
in the same manner as raising cattle and swine on land. Marine
resources at the same time are not in the stage of extermina-
tion.36
The necessity for a reorganization of the components of the
Japanese whaling industry has been cited in Japanese news
stories as an immediate and direct impact of the cutbacks in whale
catches adopted in the 1975 IWC meeting as has the detrimental
effect upon "the livelihood of crew members of whaling ships." 37
One representative of the Japanese whaling industry acknowl-
edged that three major whaling companies, Nippon Hogei, Nitto
Hogei, and Kokuzo Hogei, would merge by spring, 1976. In
anticipation of a sizable cut in Japan's whale catch, the cost of
whale meat in Japan rose 38 percent over the prices of June, 1974,
reaching close to the price level of pork. 38  The division of cer-
tain quotas set in the 1975 IWC meeting was left to be negotiated
by Japan and the Soviet Union. The Japanese press anticipated
that Japanese fisheries would face "hard negotiations with the
Soviet Union to share the catch of fin whales in an Antarctic
area which is not Japan's traditional whaling ground." 39  In
short, the initial Japanese reactions were negative, seriously con-
36 Morisawa, International Opinion on Whaling and Japan's Position, 31 KEIDAN-
REN REVIEW 7-12 (Nov. 1974).
37 Comment of Toshio Futami, member of the central committee of the all-
Japan Seaman's Union, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
38 Id. See also Japan Times Weekly, July 5, 1975, at 3, col. 3.
39 Japan Times Weekly, July 5, 1975, at 3, col. 1; Japan Times Weekly,
July 12, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
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cerned, but not clearly committed to rejection of the cutbacks;
although, as noted above, at the time of the completion of the
Work Paper, the 90-day period in which Japan may negate its
observance of the IWC cutbacks had not ended.
The initial responses of several major environmental groups
were complete rejection of the Australian amendment. The
cutbacks were applauded but then condemned as being far too
limited. Several conservation groups had observers at the Lon-
don IWC meeting and by mid-July, sent to their members
critiques of the decisions. The comments of the newsletter of
the Society for Animal Protection Legislation, Washington, D.C.,
provide a representative reaction:
The IWC still belongs to the old guard. Yet this
year's quota cuts (approximately 8,500 whales) were larger than
any ever adopted in the past. The boycott and demonstrations
have had an effect. Their continuance is essential if further
needed protection for the whales is to be won. Indeed they are
needed even to hold the modest gains won this year. When
the antarctic fin whale quota was cut to 220, Mr. Fujita stressed
that this must be the decision for this year only, and Mr. Rindal
reassured him that indeed that was always so. The Chairman's
reassurance that the reduced fin whale quota is "only for the
coming season which has always been the case," makes clear
the transitory nature of any protection the IWC may give.4°
Clearly, the battle lines between the conservation group and
the whaling industries have not been altered. Whether IWC's
new policy of more drastic cutbacks will be continued and ex-
tended, whether nations such as Japan and the Soviet Union
will seek to evade compliance, either by opting out under IWC
rules, or by transferring their whaling operations to whaling na-
tions which do not belong to IWC (such as Chile, Peru or
Somalia), and whether national and international conservation
groups successfully intensify their efforts at boycotting and pro-
hibiting whaling activities and sales via national legislation, all
are questions which will have a direct bearing on the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission and its future or demise as an inter-
national body. The United States Commissioner, Robert M.
White, provided a balanced assessment of some of the immediate
problems which demand resolution:
While the United States is pleased at the progress made here,
it feels that many steps remain to be taken. The data on which
40 Newsletter of the Society for Animal Protective Legislation, July 18, 1975,
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Management Procedure are based are uncertain and require
much improvement. As whaling operations go down, we
need to ensure that whaling vessels retired by IWC members
do not come to be used for whaling by non-IWC nations. We
need to enlist in the IWC whaling nations who are non-IWC
members. We need to investigate more humane methods of
killing whales, and we need to step up research so that our
understanding of whales is more adequate.41
To date, the efforts on the part of international organizations
to build an international la"w on whaling have not been particu-
larly satisfactory. Part of the problem has been the difficulty
of obtaining commonly accepted, scientific facts as to the condi-
tion of the whale. From the perspective of some whaling nations
it has seemed that it has been almost necessary to destroy the
whale before it could be seen that its numbers had been severely
diminished.
Over time, science and technology are providing substitutes
for whale products. This may substantially reduce reliance on
the whale from a general economic point of view. But there is
an urgent need for nations to accelerate this process and develop a
serious commitment to this goal in the harvesting nations.
41 Statement of the Honorable Robert M. White, U.S. Commissioner to the
International Whaling Commission, June 27, 1975.
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